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Abstract
Popular guidance on observational data analysis states that outcomes should be
blinded when determining matching criteria or propensity scores. Such a blinding is
informally said to maintain the “objectivity” of the analysis (Rubin, 2001, 2007; Rubin
et al., 2008). To explore these issues, we begin by proposing a definition of objectivity
based on the worst-case bias that can occur without blinding, which we call added
variable bias. This bias is indeed severe, and can diverge towards infinity as the sample
size grows. However, we also show that bias of the same order of magnitude can occur
even if the outcomes are blinded, so long as some prior knowledge is available that links
covariates to outcomes. Finally, we outline an alternative sample partitioning procedure
for estimating the average treatment effect on the controls, or the average treatment
effect on the treated, while avoiding added variable bias. This procedure allows for the
analysis to not be fully prespecified; uses all of the the outcome data from all partitions
in the final analysis step; and does not require blinding. Together, these results illustrate
that outcome blinding is neither necessary nor sufficient for preventing added variable
bias, and should not be considered a requirement when evaluating novel causal inference
methods.
Keywords: best practice; confounder selection; objective design; observational data; over-
fitting; p-hacking; propensity scores; standards of evidence.
1 Introduction
Well-known guidance from Rubin (2001, 2007); Rubin et al. (2008) on analyzing observational
data suggests that analysts blind themselves to outcome data when determining matching
criteria, propensity scores, or other weighting schemes. Under such a blinding, these three
approaches are each said to be part of the “design” stage of experimentation. The rationale
for having a delineated, blinded design stage is that (1) observational analysis should mimic
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randomized experiments, and outcomes are not observable during the design stage of an ex-
periment; and that (2) viewing the outcomes opens the possibility of subconsciously tinkering
until a significant result is produced.
These issues are of primary concern for analyses submitted to external decision makers,
such as regulatory agencies, judges, or journal editors. In these cases, it is desirable to de-
velop safeguards that prevent misleading conclusions, regardless of whether the researcher’s
conscious intent is to mislead. One commonly used safeguard is to fully prespecify the anal-
ysis, which explicitly prohibits the kind of data-driven tinkering described above (Mathieu
et al., 2009; Humphreys et al., 2013; Gelman and Loken, 2013). Under full prespecification,
researchers are not permitted to adapt their primary analysis method for a dataset based
on initial exploratory analyses of that same dataset. Rubin et al. (2008) proposes outcome
blinding as a more flexible alternative to fully prespecified models. So, for consistency, this
article also primarily focuses on flexible analyses that lack full prespecification.
While outcome blinding has become widely used (Steiner et al., 2010; Shadish and Steiner,
2010; Yue, 2012; Yue et al., 2014; Li et al., 2016; Kainz et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2019; King and
Nielsen, 2019), some questions and debates remain open. Rubin (2001, 2007); Rubin et al.
(2008) summarize the benefits of outcome blinding by saying that it maintains “objectivity,”
but do not provide a precise definition of objectivity. Further, blinding outcomes has not
always been encouraged, as an inability to view outcomes can impede confounder selection,
limiting the effectiveness of matching or weighting (McCandless et al., 2009; De Luna et al.,
2011; Zigler and Dominici, 2014; Shortreed and Ertefaie, 2017; D’Amour and Franks, 2019).
To our knowledge, deeper study of these issues is still desired (Varadhan et al., 2012).
This article argues that, while the problem that outcome blinding intends to solve can
indeed be very severe, outcome blinding is not always an adequate safeguard against this
problem. We begin by offering a formalization of “objectivity” based on the worst-case bias
that can occur without blinding, which we call added variable bias (Section 3). This bias
happens when, through a combination of overfitting and conditioning on non-confounders, we
up-weight high outcomes on treatment and down-weight high outcomes on control. In fairly
simple settings, the bias can diverge gradually towards infinity as the sample size grows.
However, we also show that blinding the outcomes is not sufficient for preventing such
bias. A malicious, blinded analyst can reach bias of the same order of magnitude, so long as
some prior knowledge is available that links covariates to outcomes (Section 4). The intuition
of this result is that overfitting can occur whenever the outcomes can be predicted, even if
the outcomes are not directly observed.
To highlight that blinding is not necessary for preventing bias, we discuss a sample par-
titioning method for estimating the average treatment effect on the controls (ATC) or the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). This partitioning procedure avoids added vari-
able bias without “throwing away” any of the outcome data from any of the partitions, and
without fully prespecifying all stages of the analysis (Section 5). We close with a discussion
(Section 6). All proofs are provided in the appendix.
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2 Notation & assumptions
We consider the scenario where analysts wish to study the distribution of potential outcomes
under treatment and control, denoted by the random variables Y˜ treat and Y˜ control respectively,
with higher values denoting better outcomes. In particular, we aim to estimate the average
treatment effect ∆ := E(Y˜ treat − Y˜ control). Let A be an indication of treatment, assumed to
occur with probability 0.5. Let X denote a random vector of possible confounders. We will
generally denote realizations of random variables with lower case letters (e.g., a and x).
We assume that analysts observe an equal number (n/2) of treated and control individuals,
with n ≥ 4. Let {Y controli , Xcontroli }n/2i=1 be random variables representing the control observa-
tions, which are iid draws from the distribution P (Y˜ control, X|A = 0). Let {Y treatj , Xtreatj }n/2j=1
be random variables representing treated observations, which are iid draws from the distri-
bution P (Y˜ treat, X|A = 1). Here, the difference in index notation is meant to emphasize that
Y controli and Y treatj come from separate individuals, even when i = j. Because variables are
iid within each arm, we will often omit the subscripts i and j.
Let Z(i) denote the ith order statistic for a random variable Z, within a particular arm.
For example, ycontrol(i) represents realizations of Y
control
(i) , such that y
control
(1) ≤ · · · ≤ ycontrol(n/2) .
In this setting, analysts do not know if the observed data distributions are representative
of the overall population. That is, analysts to not know if P (Y control) = P (Y˜ control|A = 0) is
equal to P (Y˜ control), or if P (Y treat) = P (Y˜ treat|A = 1) is equal to P (Y˜ treat). Due to this lack
of knowledge, analysts will need to consider balancing on X to ensure that the treated and
control groups are comparable.
For simplicity, we will assume below thatX is not actually a confounder (A ⊥ X), but that
analysts are not aware of this fact. We will also assume below that there are no additional,
unmeasured confounders, such that Y control and Y treat follow the same distribution as Y˜ control
and Y˜ treat respectively (see, for example, the assumptions of Theorem 2, below). This will
imply that the expected, unadjusted difference in means between the two observed samples
is equal to the true treatment effect in the underlying population of interest (E(Y treat −
Y control) = E(Y˜ treat − Y˜ control) = ∆).
3 Worst-case bias in the unblinded setting
In this section, we consider the setting where the unblinded sample data is used to identify
new categorical features f(x) on which to balance. We outline a condition on f under which
this balancing produces maximal bias, and explore how dramatic the bias can be.
We assume that, after choosing the features f , the ATE will be estimated by the inverse
propensity score weighted estimator
∆ˆf :=
1
n
 n/2∑
j=1
ytreatj pif (xj)
−1 −
n/2∑
i=1
ycontroli {1− pif (xi)}−1
 , (1)
where
pif (x) :=
∑n/2
j=1 1{f(xtreatj ) = f(x)}∑n/2
i=1 1{f(xcontroli ) = f(x)}+
∑n/2
j=1 1{f(xtreatj ) = f(x)}
(2)
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Figure 1: Worst-case weighting – Panel (A) shows an illustrative example of raw data. Panel
(B) colors each observation by a new feature f(x), which satisfies Condition 1. Panel (C)
shows the weighted data set, using inverse propensity score weights based on f(x) (see Eq
(2)).
is a nonparametric propensity score, and 1(z) is an indicator of the event z. This estimator is
also equivalent to the estimator resulting from stratification on f(x). To ensure that weights
in Eq (1) are well-defined, we require that any feature f satisfies in-sample positivity, meaning
that
∑n/2
i=1 1
{
f(xcontroli ) = k
}
> 0 and
∑n/2
j=1 1
{
f(xtreatj ) = k
}
> 0 for all values k in the range
of f .
Bias in the unblinded setting can occur when researchers stratify on apparent risk factors
that are, by chance, rare on control and common on treatment. In the extreme, suppose that
an unblinded analyst creates a binary feature f(x) that satisfies the following condition.
Condition 1. (Worst-case unblinded features) Given the observed dataset {ycontroli , xcontroli }n/2i=1
and {ytreatj , xtreatj }n/2j=1, the function f satisfies
• (Include lowest control) f(xcontroli ) = 1 for any i such that ycontroli = ycontrol(1) ;
• (Exclude remaining controls) f(xcontroli ) = 0 for any i such that ycontroli > ycontrol(1) ;
• (Exclude highest treated)f(xtreatj ) = 0 for any j such that ytreatedj = ytreat(n/2); and
• (Include remaining treated) f(xtreatj ) = 1 for any j such that ytreatedj < ytreat(n/2).
We will see that any feature satisfying Condition 1 maximizes the bias of ∆ˆf . In words,
Condition 1 requires that f(xi) is 1 only for the control observation with the lowest outcome,
and is zero for all other controls. Within treated, Condition 1 requires that f(xj) equals
1 for everyone except the person with the highest outcome. This condition only constrains
f on the realized values of X, not on unobserved values in the domain of X. When X is
continuous and n ≥ 4, a malicious analyst can almost always define a feature f(X) that
satisfies Condition 1 (with probability 1). An illustration of such a feature is shown in Figure
1, in which the true treatment effect is zero. Here, the bias produced by conditioning on f(x)
is dramatic.
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This problem is only worsened in large samples, where the bias can diverge towards
infinity. We formalize this in the theorem below.
Theorem 2. (Bias in unblinded scenario) Suppose that the following conditions hold.
1. (Homogeneous Effect) Y˜ treat = Y˜ control +∆, that is, the individual treatment effect takes
the form of a constant (possibly null) shift.
2. (No Confounding) Y treat and Y control follow the same marginal distributions as Y˜ treat
and Y˜ control. That is, P (Y˜ treat|A = 1) = P (Y˜ treat), and P (Y˜ control|A = 0) = P (Y˜ control).
3. (Worst-Case Features) the features f are adaptively determined to meet Condition 1,
with probability 1.
Under these conditions, the expectation of ∆ˆf is equal to
E∆ˆf = E
{
Y control(n/2) − Y control(1)
}(1
2
− 1
n− 2
)
+ ∆. (3)
Roughly speaking, the first term in Eq (3) represents the bias incurred by isolating the
extremes of a particular sample. Thus, if Y control is a continuous variable with nonnegative
support across the real line, then the bias of ∆ˆf diverges towards infinity. For example, if
Y control follows a standard normal distribution, then the bias grows at a rate approximately
proportional to
√
log(n/2) (see Theorem 1.5.3 of Leadbetter et al., 1983).1
We refer to this type of bias as added variable bias : bias from adjusting for a variable
that causes artificial up-weighting of individuals with high outcomes on treatment, or low
outcomes on control. Even though Condition 1 is unlikely to be satisfied in practice, we
can see that unblinding outcomes open us up to the possibility of some amount of bias if
we do not take precautions. These danger of extreme bias are one natural formalization of
the objectivity arguments for delineating a design stage in which outcomes are blinded (see
Section 1).
In order to compare the potential biases incurred in the blinded and unblinded settings,
it is helpful to bound the degree of bias that can occur in the unblinded setting. With this
in mind, we note that balancing on any feature satisfying Condition 1 does indeed produce
the worst possible bias.
Remark 3. (Worst-case added variable bias) If n ≥ 4, then any feature f(x) satisfying Con-
dition 1 in a particular dataset {ycontroli , xcontroli }n/2i=1 and {ytreatj , xtreatj }n/2j=1 produces the highest
estimate ∆ˆf over all discrete features satisfying in-sample positivity.
The intuition behind Remark 3 is that balancing on any other feature will only shift
weight away from the extremes of the sample.
1More specifically, Theorem 1.5.3 of Leadbetter et al., 1983 implies that the bias is approximately equal
to
{
2×
(√
2 log(n/2) +
2× 0.5772− log(4pi)− log(log(n/2))
2
√
2 log(n/2)
)}
×
(
1
2
− 1
n− 2
)
, (4)
where the term in curly braces is the approximate expectation of E
{
Y control(n/2) − Y control(1)
}
.
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4 Worse-case bias diverges to infinity, even with blinding
While outcome blinding might seem to solve the added variable bias described above, similar
dangers exist even if the outcomes are blinded, so long as they can be predicted. This can
happen, for example, if an observed variableX is known a priori to be correlated with Y control,
but is independent of the treatment mechanism. Since X serves as an approximate proxy for
Y , a malicious analyst can inappropriately upweight values high values of Y (on expectation)
by up-weighting high values of X.
To describe this proxy relationship explicitly, we denote Yˆ control := E(Y control|Xcontrol)
and Yˆ treat := E(Y treat|Xtreat) as random functions of Xcontrol and Xtreat representing the
predicted outcome values. We can now put forward a version of Condition 1 where the
blinded outcomes Y control, Y treat are replaced with their observed proxies, Yˆ control, Yˆ treat.
Condition 4. (Blinded version of Condition 1) Given the observed, blinded datasets {yˆcontroli , xcontroli }n/2i=1
and {yˆtreatj , xtreatj }n/2j=1, the function f satisfies
• (Include lowest control) f(xcontroli ) = 1 for any i such that yˆcontroli = yˆcontrol(1) ;
• (Exclude remaining controls) f(xcontroli ) = 0 for any i such that yˆcontroli > yˆcontrol(1) ;
• (Exclude highest treated)f(xtreatj ) = 0 for any j such that yˆtreatedj = yˆtreat(n/2); and
• (Include remaining treated) f(xtreatj ) = 1 for any j such that yˆtreatedj < yˆtreat(n/2).
Analogous to Condition 1, Condition 4 represents the extreme case of a risk factor that
is, by chance, rare on control and common on treatment. Weighting on a feature f that
satisfies Condition 4 will upweight high values of Yˆ treat, and upweight low values of Yˆ control,
resulting in positive bias.
As with Condition 1, a malicious analyst can almost always satisfy Condition 4 (with
probability 1) if Yˆ control and Yˆ treat are continuous and n ≥ 4. The precise form of the
conditional expectation functions E(Y control|Xcontrol) and E(Y treat|Xtreat) need not be known
by such an analyst. For example, if outcomes are known to increase monotonically with X,
this knowledge is sufficient to produce a feature f that satisfies Condition 4.
Even with no prior knowledge, a malicious analyst might still satisfy Condition 4 via
sample splitting. Suppose that an analyst splits a sample into two partitions; learns the
relationship between covariates and outcomes using the first partition; applies this knowledge
to find a feature satisfying Condition 4 in the second partition; and then estimates the
treatment effect by stratifying on this feature, again using the second partition. While this
kind of sample splitting might appear ostensibly defendable, it still allows analysts to overfit
within the second partition, and to approximately satisfy Condition 4.
Armed with Condition 4, we can now quantify the worst-case added variable bias in
blinded settings.
Theorem 5. (Blinded version of Theorem 2) Suppose that the following conditions hold.
1. (Homogeneous Effect) Y˜ treat = Y˜ control +∆, that is, the individual treatment effect takes
the form of a constant (possibly null) shift.
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2. (Blinded Version of No Confounding) (Y treat, X treat) and (Y control, Xcontrol) follow the
same distributions as (Y˜ treat, X) and (Y˜ control, X) respectively.2
3. (Worst-Case Blinded Features) the features f are adaptively determined to meet Con-
dition 4, with probability 1.
Under these conditions, the unconditional expectation of ∆ˆf is equal to
E∆ˆf = E
{
Yˆ control(n/2) − Yˆ control(1)
}(1
2
− 1
n− 2
)
+ ∆. (5)
In Eq (5), we can see that the bias of ∆ˆf depends on how much variability in Y can
be explained, or predicted, from X. As an example, consider the case where X and Y control
follow a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and correlation ρ > 0. In this case,
Yˆ control = E
(
Y control|Xcontrol) = ρXcontrol, and Theorem 5 implies that
E∆ˆf = ρE
{
Xcontrol(n/2) −Xcontrol(1)
}(1
2
− 1
n− 2
)
+ ∆. (6)
Here, since Xcontrol(1) and Y
control
(1) have the same marginal distribution, the bias in the blinded
case (Eq (6)) is proportional to the worst-case bias in the unblinded case (Eq (3)). In each
case, the bias grows at a rate approximately proportional to
√
log(n/2) (see discussion of
Leadbetter et al., 1983 in Section 3). Figure 2 illustrates this phenomenon for different values
of ρ, showing that bias can diverge to infinity even when outcomes are blinded.
We end this section by formalizing the idea that, when the covariates are observed but
the outcomes are not, balancing on a feature that satisfies Condition 4 does indeed produce
the worst possible bias.
Remark 6. (Blinded version of Remark 3) Suppose that the covariates {xcontroli }n/2i=1 and
{xtreatj }n/2j=1, are observed, but the outcomes {ycontroli }n/2i=1 and {ytreatj }n/2j=1, are not. Given the
observed covariates {xcontroli }n/2i=1 and {xtreatj }n/2j=1, balancing on a feature satisfying Condition
4 produces the highest possible value of E
[
∆ˆf |{xcontroli }n/2i=1, {xtreatj }n/2j=1
]
over all discrete fea-
tures satisfying in-sample positivity.
The proof follows the same logic as the proof for Remark 3, but with predicted outcomes
replacing the observed outcomes.
5 Outcome blinding is not necessary: other methods to
avoid added variable bias
Thus far, we have shown that outcome blinding is not sufficient for preventing added variable
bias. In this section, we discuss simple strategies that can prevent added variable bias, while
still allowing a limited form of sample exploration.
2That is, P (Y˜ treat, X|A = 1) = P (Y˜ treat, X) and P (Y˜ control, X|A = 0) = P (Y˜ control, X).
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Figure 2: Worst-case bias in the blinded setting – Above, we illustrate the multivariate
normal setting described in Section 4. Here, the worst-case bias is a function of the sample
size and the correlation (ρ) between X and Y . When ρ = 1, we recover the worst-case bias
from the unblinded setting. When ρ < 1, the worst-case bias in the blinded setting grows
proportionally to the worst-case bias in the unblinded setting.
Of course, one classic approach is to determine features from a subsample, and apply these
features in a separate subsample to estimate treatment effects. Alternatively, analysts can
test for overfitting by seeing if the distribution of f(X) changes when moving to a holdout
dataset of covariates. Such a change would indicate that f has been overfit to the dataset
used to estimate the treatment effect, causing the distribution of f(X) in that dataset to be
non-representative. Unfortunately, the first approach requires that we “throw away” half of
the outcome data in the final estimation step, and the second approach does not offer a way
to fix the bias that it identifies.
As a third approach, we briefly note here that unblinded sample splitting can still be
used in a way that allows all data points to be used in the final treatment effect estimation,
as long as the final estimand is either the ATT or the ATC. As an illustration, we focus on
estimation for the ATC, E(Y˜ treat − Y˜ control|A = 0).
Algorithm 7. Sample splitting for the ATC
1. Partition the control data into two parts, P control1 and P control2 .
2. Using the outcome data Y control and the covariate data Xcontrol from P control1 , identify
potential, discrete confounders to include in the propensity score model. Let f(X)
denote these discovered features, with a range equal to {1, . . . , K}.
3. Stratify the treated data by the feature f(X), reweighting the treated data according the
empirical distribution of f(X) in the P control2 partition. Use these weights to estimate
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E(Y˜ treat|A = 0) as
K∑
k=1
{∑n/2
j=1 y
treat
j 1(f(x
treat
j ) = k)∑n/2
j=1 1(f(xi) = k)
}{∑
i∈P control2 1(f(x
control
i ) = k)
|P control2 |
}
.
4. Using the control outcomes from both partitions, estimate E(Y control|A = 0) as the sam-
ple average (n/2)−1
∑n/2
i=1 y
control
i . Subtract this from the estimate in Step 3 to estimate
the ATC.
Because the weights for the control patients are unchanged regardless of the balancing
features, it does not matter that some individuals (in P control1 ) are used to estimate both
f(X) and E(Y control|A = 0). Because the features f are derived using data (P control1 ) that is
separated from the data on which they are applied (P control2 and the treated data), the features
can be viewed as effectively prespecified. In this way, Algorithm 7 avoids the overfitting that
can lead to added variable bias. A comparable procedure can be used to estimate the ATT
be switching the roles of the control and treated subpopulations in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 does not use strictly less data than outcome blinding during a separated
design stage. Rather it uses different data. Algorithm 7 but blinds some of the covariates
when determining weights, while outcome blinded (of course) blinds the outcomes. In their
final steps, both approaches use the full set of outcomes to estimate a treatment effect.
6 Discussion
Commonly followed guidance on analyzing observational data suggests that outcome blinding
maintains the objectivity of the result. We have offered one formalization of objectivity:
added variable bias. We have shown that, while severe added variable bias can indeed be
incurred from overfitting to unblinded outcomes, bias of the same order of magnitude can be
incurred in the blinded setting by overfitting to predicted outcomes. We have also outlined
simple, unblinded procedures for avoiding such forms of bias, which do not require any
outcome data to be discarded in the final analysis.
An important caveat is that the worst-case biased for blinded scenarios appears to require
that analysts actually be malicious, while bias in unblinded scenarios could plausibly be the
result of well-intentioned analysts second guessing their methods after seeing a surprising
result. For this reason, the insufficiencies of outcome blinding should primarily be of concern
when analysts present reports to external decision makers with conflicting incentives (e.g.,
journal editors, regulatory agencies, or judges). Here, the external decision makers may wish
to enforce safeguards that protect against bias regardless of its cause. On the other hand,
outcome blinding may still be a useful tool for analysts reporting to internal decision makers,
as the analyst’s team will bear the cost of any poorly informed decision, and there is less
incentive to mislead.
The worst-case bias examples described in this article are extreme and illustrative. Actual
biasing features occurring in practice will not be so severe or obvious, especially in low dimen-
sional settings. The risk of creating bias can also be mitigated though other precautions, such
as involving domain experts in a design stage. In fact, identifying confounders fundamentally
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requires knowledge of the underlying causal pathways (Pearl, 2012; VanderWeele, 2019). To
some extent, similar appeals to expert knowledge are outlined in Rubin et al. (2008) as well,
beyond outcome blinding alone.
Still, outcome blinding has become a dominant take-away from Rubin (2001, 2007); Rubin
et al. (2008), and is now somewhat widespread (Steiner et al., 2010; Shadish and Steiner,
2010; Yue, 2012; Yue et al., 2014; Li et al., 2016; Kainz et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2019; King and
Nielsen, 2019). This is possibly because it is generally more difficult to prove that sufficient
domain expertise has been engaged than it is to prove that outcomes have been blinded. This
simplicity of outcome blinding is a valid benefit. Again though, we have unfortunately seen
that outcome binding is neither necessary nor sufficient to safeguard against added variable
bias.
Indeed, many modern causal inference approaches are unblinded, studying the treatment
mechanism and the outcome mechanism simultaneously (De Luna et al., 2011; Zigler and
Dominici, 2014; Shortreed and Ertefaie, 2017; D’Amour and Franks, 2019). When applied as
prespecified procedures, any such method can be studied through theory and simulation, and
should not be dismissed simply because it does not delegate outcome analysis to a separate
stage.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Since f satisfies Condition 1, the weighted estimator ∆ˆf in Eq (1) reduces to
∆ˆf =
Y treat(n/2) − Y control(1)
2
+
{∑(n/2)−1
j=1 Y
treat
(j)
n− 2 −
∑(n/2)
i=2 Y
control
(i)
n− 2
}
=
Y treat(n/2) − Y control(1)
2
+
{∑(n/2)−1
i=2 Y
treat
(i) − Y control(i)
n− 2
}
+
Y treat(1) − Y control(n/2)
n− 2 . (7)
Since Y˜ treat = Y˜ control + ∆, we know that EY˜ treat(i) = EY˜
control
(i) + ∆. Furthermore, since
Y treat and Y control follow the same marginal distribution as Y˜ treat and Y˜ control, we know that
EY treat(i) = EY
control
(i) + ∆. Applying this to Eq (7), we have
E∆ˆf
=
∆ + E
{
Y control(n/2) − Y control(1)
}
2
+
{∑(n/2)−1
i=2 ∆
n− 2
}
+
∆ + E
{
Y control(1) − Y control(n/2)
}
n− 2
= E
{
Y control(n/2) − Y control(1)
}(1
2
− 1
n− 2
)
+ ∆
(
1
2
+
n/2− 2
n− 2 +
1
n− 2
)
= E
{
Y control(n/2) − Y control(1)
}(1
2
− 1
n− 2
)
+ ∆. (8)
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B Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. The proof follows similar steps as the proof for Theorem 2. The difference is that,
here, we replace the outcomes with their conditional expectations Yˆ controli and Yˆ treatj .
First we note the expectation of ∆f can be expressed in terms of Yˆ controli and Yˆ treatj . Let
X denote the full set of covariates
{
{Xcontroli }n/2i=1, {Xtreatj }n/2j=1
}
. Then
E∆ˆf = E
 n/2∑
j=1
Y treatj pif (X
treat
j )
−1 −
n/2∑
i=1
Y controli
(
1− pif (Xcontroli )
)−1
=
1
n
EX
 n/2∑
j=1
E
{
Y treatj pif (X
treat
j )
−1|X}− n/2∑
i=1
E
{
Y controli
(
1− pif (Xcontroli )
)−1 |X}

=
1
n
EX
 n/2∑
j=1
E
{
Y treatj |X
}
pif (X
treat
j )
−1 −
n/2∑
i=1
E
{
Y controli |X
} (
1− pif (Xcontroli )
)−1
=
1
n
EX
 n/2∑
j=1
Yˆ treatj pif (X
treat
j )
−1 −
n/2∑
i=1
Yˆ controli
(
1− pif (Xcontroli )
)−1 .
As in Eq (7), because f satisfies Condition 4, we have
E∆ˆf = E
[
Yˆ treat(n/2) − Yˆ control(1)
2
+
{∑(n/2)−1
i=2 Yˆ
treat
(i) − Yˆ control(i)
n− 2
}
+
Yˆ treat(1) − Yˆ control(n/2)
n− 2
]
. (9)
We know from our assumptions that
Y˜ treat = Y˜ control + ∆
E(Y˜ treat|X) = E(Y˜ control|X) + ∆
E(Y treat|X) = E(Y control|X) + ∆,
where the last line is a random function of X. Since Xcontrol and Xtreat follow the same
distribution as X, we know that EYˆ treat(i) = EYˆ
control
(i) + ∆. Applying this to Eq (9) and
following the same steps as in Eq (8) gives
E∆ˆf =
∆ + EYˆ control(n/2) − EYˆ control(1)
2
+
{∑(n/2)−1
i=2 ∆
n− 2
}
+
∆ + Yˆ control(1) − Yˆ control(n/2)
n− 2
=
EYˆ control(n/2) − EYˆ control(1)
2
(
1
2
+
1
n− 2
)
+ ∆.
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C Proof of Remarks 3 & 6
Proof. We note in Section C.1, below, that any inverse propensity weight (either pif (x)−1 or
{1− pif (x)}−1) is between n/2 and n/2n/2−1 , due to the in-sample positivity constraints.
From here, we show Remark 3 by noting that the realization of Eq (7) assigns maximal
weight to ytreat(n/2) and minimal weight to the remaining treated observations. Because pif (xj)
−1
is an inverse propensity weight, the weighted mean within the treated arm is a convex com-
bination of the observations in that arm. Thus, any deviation from the weights in Eq (7)
must involve shifting weight towards lower values of Y treat, which would reduce the estimated
treatment effect. Likewise, any change to the control weights must result in shifting weight
towards higher values Y control, which would also reduce the estimated treatment effect. This
completes the proof of Remark 3.
The proof for Remark 6 is similar, but replaces ytreati and ycontroli with yˆtreati and yˆcontroli .
Given {xcontroli }ni=1, {xtreatj }nj=1, and f , the conditional expectation of the blinded estimator is
1
n
 n/2∑
j=1
yˆtreatj pif (xj)
−1 −
n/2∑
i=1
yˆcontroli {1− pif (xi)}−1
 .
Suppose that f satisfies Condition 4, given {xcontroli }ni=1, and {xtreatj }nj=1. As before, we
know that the IPW weights based on f place maximal weight on yˆtreat(n/2) and yˆ
control
(1) , and
minimal weight on the remaining terms. Any other weighting scheme will either shift weight
towards lower treated terms yˆtreatj < yˆtreat(n/2), or shift weight towards higher control terms
yˆcontroli > yˆ
control
(1) . Either of these changes will diminish the conditional expectation of the
effect estimate.
C.1 All IPW weights must be between n/2n/2−1 and
n
2
Proof. Consider a discrete-valued stratifying feature f(x) taking values 1, . . . , K, with K >
1. Any such feature can be viewed as a way of grouping together observations into K
groups with “comparable” baseline values for x. Let tk :=
∑n/2
j=1 1{f(xtreatj ) = k} and ck :=∑n/2
i=1 1{f(xcontroli ) = k} be the number of treated and control patients in the kth group. Since
ck, tk ∈ [1, n/2 − 1] by the in-sample positivity constraint, we see that the maximum IPW
weight is no more than
max
ck,tk∈[1,n/2−1]
(
tk
tk + ck
)−1
= max
ck,tk∈[1,n/2−1]
1 + ck/tk
= n/2.
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Likewise, the smallest possible IPW weight is no less than
min
ck,tk∈[1,n/2−1]
(
tk
tk + ck
)−1
= min
ck,tk∈[1,n/2−1]
[1 + ck/tk]
= 1 +
1
n/2− 1
=
n/2
n/2− 1 .
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